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PEN REGISTERS AFTER SMITH V. MARYLAND
INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Maryland' the Supreme Court held that the use of
pen registers without a warrant does not violate the fourth amend-
ment.2 A pen register is a device that is installed at the telephone com-
pany and automatically records all numbers dialed from the line to
which it is attached, as well as incoming rings.3 Unlike a wiretap, a pen
register does not require constant monitoring. As a consequence, the
pen register is an attractive surveillance tool.
Law enforcement officers need not secure a warrant before
installing a pen register because the use of the device was found not to
be a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. But the
pen register can reveal much about a person's private life. The device
also implicates associational rights under the first amendment: infor-
mation from many pen registers, or from one at a group's headquar-
ters, can develop a complete picture of the network of associations
among a large number of people.'
Smith reversed earlier assumptions about pen registers, 5 and is an
example of the trend in federal courts to exempt from fourth amend-
'442 U.S. 735 (1979).
2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment has been held applicable to some
telephone surveillances. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wire-
taps).
I United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977). A modern
pen register will simultaneously record the date and time of the call. The often-cited
description of pen registers in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n. 1
(1974), describes an earlier and less sophisticated machine. See Brief for Respondent
at 16, United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
" See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (requiring political organi-
zation to divulge its membership list infringes members' freedom of association).
I See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165 n.7 (1977) (govern-
ment conceded applicability of fourth amendment to pen registers and Court expli-
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ment limitations such governmental surveillance tools as mail covers,6
tracking devices7 and scrutiny of bank records.' The authors contend
that the trend fails to reflect the first and fourth amendment interests.
Part I of this Comment will examine the trend in the light of current
fourth amendment doctrine. Part II examines the possibility of limit-
ing the Smith decision to its facts. Part III suggests that the first
amendment can work as a safeguard against extended or unlimited use
of pen registers. Part IV will conclude with a discussion of the absence
of federal statutory protection against pen register surveillance, and
offer a statutory method of providing such protection.
I. FLAWS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Degrees of Privacy
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz v. United States,9 most clearly
explained the test used by the Court to determine whether a search has
been conducted. He recognized a search only if the victim of the search
citly declined to decide question); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54
(1974) (probable cause requirement of fourth amendment satisfied, mooting issue of
applicability of fourth amendment to pen registers) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 E2d
243, 245 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978); In Re Order Authorizing
the Use of a Pen Register, 538 E2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v.
John, 508 F2d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 E2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Doolittle,
507 E2d 1368, 1371 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 518 E2d 500 (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1008 (1975); United States v. Brick, 502 E2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Falcone, 505 F2d 478, 482 n.21 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 576 E2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978). Mail covers involve the recording by postal employees of the out-
sides of first-class envelopes, and sometimes the insides of lower-class mail, addressed
to a given person. 39 C.FR. § 233.2 (1980).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1002 (1976). Contra, United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 537 E2d 227 (1976) (en banc) (warrant required).
'United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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"'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and "society
is prepared to recognize [that expectation] as 'reasonable! '"0 Under
this test one's privacy expectations depend, among other things, on
technology and legal rules.
Two bank records cases demonstrate the consequences of allow-
ing the fourth amendment to expand or contract as technology grows
or legal rules change. In California Bankers Association v. Schultz,"
the Court held that "the mere maintenance of the records [iLe, checks,
deposits, withdrawals, etc.] by the banks under the compulsion of the
regulations invaded no fourth amendment right of any depositor," '2
because the recordkeeping "regulation [does not] require that any
information contained in the records be disclosed to the Govern-
ment.' '" 3 Twoyears later, in United States v. Miller,'4 the Court decided
that although the bank may have been forced to keep these records,
the depositor could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy in
them.' 5
In both California Bankers and Miller, the judicially approved
bank-record laws narrowed the scope of the fourth amendment by
contracting citizens' expectations. More importantly, the bank records
cases demonstrate the Court's general insensitivity to degrees of pri-
vacy'6 in'fourth amendment analysis. People reveal information about
themselves for various, often very limited, purposes. Financial infor-
mation is conveyed to a bank in order to get a loan processed, not to
evaluate-or prosecute-a person in light of the transaction. The
10 Id. at 361. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), confirms that this is
still the sfandard for determining the applicability of the fourth amendment.
"416 U.S. 21 (1976).
1, The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1952-1953 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations requiring
banks insured-by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to keep copies of checks
and other financial records that have "a iigh degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or
regulatory investigations 'or proceedings."
"1 416 U.S. at 52, 54. The Court determined that the depositors lacked standing
because none of them alleged a transaction of sufficient amount to come under Trea-
sury Regulations, id. at 68-69, but the holding is stated in much broader terms and
was so read in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 439, 447 (1976).
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
425 U.S. at 442-43.
16 "Privacy is not a discrete commodity,, possessed absolutely or not at all:'
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1980]
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Supreme Court in Miller, however, reasoned that bank records are
"information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business," and that thus the
records "are not confidential communications."'
Miller based this "assumption of risk" argument on two informer
cases, United States v. White'8 and Hoffa v. United States. '9 But to
name these cases suggests the distinction: one expects a human being
to evaluate, digest, recall, and perhaps repeat information; a bank
merely performs and registers a transaction. An HEW report has said,
"There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for
other purposes without his consent."' Similarly mail covers involve a
transaction in which the post office is intended to be simply the
medium, not an evaluator or recorder. Yet mail covers have been held
not to be searches because the envelope is "voluntarily conveyed to the
Postal System," based on the analogy to Miller2'
Mail surveillance also reveals a second factor in analyzing degrees
of privacy: the amount of information exposed at any one time. A
person's correspondence is carried on in small parts. As former Judge
Hufstedler noted in United States v. Choate, "While an individual
may realize that an isolated piece of mail may attract the attention of
postal employees, he knows that ordinarily no one would have the
ability or inclination to remember who writes to him."22 By exposing
"7425 U.S. at 442.
Is 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (agent listened to defendant with a microphone
attached to an informer).
9 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (defendant revealed incriminating information to a
government informant). The informer case is similar to one-party consent wiretap-
ping. A person can consent to government wiring of him for sound and, according to
United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752, a speaker assumes this risk in choosing per-
sons with whom to speak. Banks are not analogous; a "speaker" cannot choose
between trustworthy and nontrustworthy banks because the government can obtain
information from all banks with equal ease.
20 SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA Sys-
TEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41(1973).
11 United States v. Choate, 576 E2d 165, 175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978) (mail cover used to determine the address in South America of defendant's
source of smuggled goods).
22 Id. at 202 (Hufstedler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 15
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isolated pieces of information, the intention to expose, or the responsi-
bility for the risk of exposure of, an entire pattern of activities cannot
be assumed.23
This distinction is clear in the tracking device cases. While one
undoubtedly has no expectation of privacy in being sighted once by a
single individual or policeman while driving in a car, the combination
of all of the sightings by all of the individuals who saw the car is
another matter entirely. To argue that because each sighting is not pri-
vate the total is also unprotected ignores the reason why the tracking
device was installed in the first place: the total of the individual sight-
ings is in fact private unless a surveillance device is used.24
The distinction between exposure to other private persons and
entities and exposure to the government, has also escaped the courts.
The Supreme Court in Miller, for example, said that "Itihe depositor
takes the risk ... that the information will be conveyed by that person
[i.e., the bank] to the Government."25 But the government prosecutes
while other citizens do not. The government has very different pur-
poses in acquiring the same information possessed by a citizen-tax
fraud as opposed to idle curiosity, membership in a subversive organi-
zation as opposed to gossip. "Mailmen should be our messengers, not
the state's newsgatherers. '26
The government is also different from individual citizens in terms
of the amount of information held. While a person driving his car may
23 The Supreme Court recognized the threat to privacy posed by massive collec-
tions of personal information in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (New
York statute recording, inter alia, the names and addresses of physicians and patients
respectively dispensing and receiving dangerous legitimate drugs held constitutional).
24 United States v. Holmes, 521 E2d 859, 866 n.13 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 527
E2d 227 (1976) (en banc). In Holmes a tracking device was attached to a van being
used to transport marijuana; government agents used this device to follow the van to
a shed where the marijuana was stored. In United States v. Hufford, 539 E2d 32 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), a tracking device was attached to a drum of
caffeine to be used in the production of illegal amphetamines. In United States v.
Moore, 562 E2d 106 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1977), agents placed track-
ing devices in a car, a van and a box of chemicals to locate a "factory" manufacturing
controlled substances. Congress has since required federal agents to obtain warrants
for the use of tracking devices. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50
U.S.C. § 1804 (1978).
25 425 U.S. at 443.
26 Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Govern-
mental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1483, 1521 (1979).
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be happy to let another citizen know that he passed the corner of Main
and Washington Streets, the driver may still reasonably expect that his
friend on the sidewalk will not also have access to the information that
the driver went through the railway underpass, and then turned right
at Sixth Street, and so on. Similarly, the individual postman or bank
teller will not be expected to retain large amounts of information.
Indeed, the information "exposed" in these ways may be meaningful
or useful only to the government. Knowing exposure to one to whom
the information will mean nothing is not equivalent to exposure to the
government, to whom it may mean a great deal.
All three measures of the degree of privacy, the purposes for
which the information is exposed, the amount of information exposed
and to whom it is revealed, are especially relevant to telephone num-
bers. First, although the telephone company is a recipient in a sense of
the number dialed, it can be expected to complete the transaction
"mechanically." The vast majority of telephone calls are forwarded
solely by machine.27 The information in numbers dialed is "exposed"
only to the telephone company and for the very limited and specific
purpose of reaching the telephone line called.
Second, human contact with phone numbers is carried on only in
small, discrete parts, with no expectation by the dialer that the pieces
are being compiled. Telephone company review of a bill or correction
of an error in a bill would ordinarily be of a similar, piecemeal nature.
Third, revelation to the telephone company is not revelation to
the government. The telephone company has a policy of maintaining
the confidentiality of the numbers dialed.2" Any use the telephone
company might make of such information-billing, determination of
correct rate structure-is very different from government
evidence gathering.
1' [I]t is only by analogy that [telephone] dial pulses are viewed as a request
for a connection. Of course, no person was the intended recipient of the
dial pulses, but rather [, the recipient was] the communication system
through which the pulses were to be relayed as a signal to activate the tele-
phone of the intended recipient of the telephone call.
United States v. Dote, 371 E2d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1966).
" Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 108, 115-16 (1970). See also
Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT & T, 593 F2d 1030, 1038 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
[Vol. 15
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All three measures of the degree of privacy lead to a conclusion
that people usually expect privacy to attach to the telephone numbers
they call or from which they receive calls. Nevertheless, due primarily
to a disregard of these measures of the degree of privacy, the Court in
Smith found no such privacy, and thus no "search" to activate the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment.
B. The Prohibition Against General Searches
In addition to its failure to recognize varying degrees of privacy
the Supreme Court has not considered that the scope of a surveillance
may also indicate whether or not a search has taken place. Specific
surveillance is, for example, the monitoring by the police of a single
suspect's telephone for a particular number-that of the complaining
party.29 Not only is this minimally intrusive, but the police have the
consent of the party whose number is being called for the disclosure of
that communication. There is a specific crime of which the suspect is
accused, and more often than not the police possess probable cause.
General surveillance, by contrast, involves targeting one or a
number of individuals and checking out all the numbers they call, get-
ting a complete and detailed picture of their lives, and others' as well.
There may be no specific crimes of which these people are accused, let
alone probable cause; law enforcement officers might merely consider
their conduct undesirable.
One need not turn to Orwell3 to find general governmental sur-
veillance. The technology for such surveillance certainly exists,3' and
recent history affords ample evidence of the willingness of government
29 A typical situation is that of obscene or harrassing calls.
3' G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FoUR (1949).
, See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971):
Perhaps the most significant threats to personal freedom are presented by
the inevitable linking of computers to existing surveillance devices for mon-
itoring people and their communications. One of the simplest contempo-
rary snooping devices is the pen register. . . . This snooping capability
could be magnified if the information drawn in by the pen register were
automatically fed into a central computer for analysis. Widespread use of
this technique would quickly reveal patterns of acquaintances and dealings
among a substantial group of people.
Id. at 43.
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officials to use that technology.32 The usefulness and convenience of
pen registers in such schemes is apparent. They are a cheap and
semi-automatic way to monitor a person's or group's contacts.
The fourth amendment itself distinguishes between general and
specific surveillances. In the second clause of the amendment (i.e., the
warrant, probable cause, and particularity requirements), every search
must be for particular things in particular places, regardless of the type
of search conducted.
History corroborates this reading of the language of the amend-
ment. General warrants, which were used to support the Crown's
licensing of printed matter,33 and writs of assistance,3" are the nemesis
of the fourth amendment.35 Though limited in England by the land-
mark case of Entick v. Carrington,36 general warrants were often
employed in the American Colonies in the 1760's to control the Colo-
nists' presses and to uncover their smuggling operations. 7 Public reac-
tion was so fierce that general warrants could seldom be enforced. 3 As
a result, the states built safeguards against general searches into their
constitutions, and these served as models for the fourth amendment. 39
When the Supreme Court has been confronted with general war-
rants, the results of the search have been suppressed. Stanford v. Texas
involved a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of two thousand
books, pamphlets and other documents in an effort to confiscate
32 See, e.g., SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COM-
PUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 223-24 (1973) (documenting former Attorney
General John Mitchell's expansion of government surveillance of citizens); Jacobs,
An Overview of National Political Intelligence, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 853, 855
(1978) (discussing former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's policy of surveillance).
,'J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20 (1966).
' Writs of assistance were used to combat Colonial smuggling. Id. at 22 n.8.
2 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-84 (1965), for an excellent discussion
of this point.
36 19 How. State Trials 1029 (1765). See also Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(1763). Parliament was also aroused to limit them in 1766. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 35 (1969).
11 N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 57-63 (1937).
3 Id. at 73-76.
J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 38-42.
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Communist literature."' The Court unanimously held that the search
violated the fourth amendment's prohibition of general searches. In
Berger v. New York, the Court based its rejection of the New York
wiretap statute on the lack of specificity as to the material to be
seized.4'
Despite the overwhelming animus against general searches, the
Supreme Court has structured its analysis of the fourth amendment so
that the whole question of the generality or specificity of a "search"
does not become relevant until it has been determined that a search
took place. Instead of focusing on the "unreasonableness" of the
search," the Court has concentrated on the definition of search.43
-This focus is incorrect on its face and as a matter of history. To
search is to take affirmative steps to acquire desired information.
Wiretaps and pen registers are surely both used for "searches" in this
sense. The sensible focus of the Court should be on whether these
"searches" are reasonable: is there probable cause to believe the search
will yield specific evidence about a specific illegal act? Whether a law
enforcement official or not, no rational being expends effort to moni-
tor telephones or to canvass a person's mail or to track a person's car if
he is not searching for information. It is, of course, true that, if a
policeman sees someone carrying a marijuana plant down Main
Street, there is no search, but this is because that detection was mere
happenstance, a coincidence. But, if a police officer is told that a per-
son has marijuana plants five feet tall in his backyard and the officer
goes over to the house, looks through the chain-link fence and sees the
0 379 U.S. 476, 477 (1965).
388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
"2 Although determination of the existence of a search under the Katz expecta-
tions test is a flexible matter because of the open-ended nature of that test, once the
determination is made the consequences rigidly follow. If a search exists, then the full
panoply of safeguards in the fourth amendment apply, absent exigent circumstances
or a search incident to arrest, see note 66 infra and accompanying text.If there is no
search, no protections whatsoever apply. The Court has rigidly separated the defini-
tion of search from the question of reasonableness. Thus, current judicial interpreta-
tions of the fourth amendment not only refuse to recognize differences in degrees of
privacy, and thus of "search," see text accompanying notes 16-28 supra, but has also
refused to apply different degrees of fourth amendment protections.
,1 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54, 356-57 (1967). For a
criticism of the Court's approach, see N. LASSON, supra note 37, at 103.
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plants, the Supreme Court would say that this does not constitute a
search. But it does in a nonlegal sense: the officer has gone to the
house for the specific purpose of looking into the yard. He has taken
affirmative steps to look for evidence. A good rule of thumb might be
that if law enforcement officers must exert great effort and employ
sophisticated surveillance techniques, they must be searching for some-
thing, and that therefore a search exists unless there is clearly no expec-
tation of privacy involved. However this standard is defined, it would
be more in keeping with the language and spirit of the fourth amend-
ment if courts would focus less on the rigidly interpreted Katz require-
ments for the existence of a search, which has led to such anomalies as
the conclusions that wiretaps are searches and pen registers are not, or
that massive government canvassing of a person's mail is not a search.
Instead, broaden the definition of a search as suggested above, or
assume in doubtful cases that a search exists, and concentrate judicial
energy on more appropriate inquiry into the reasonableness of the
"search." We become too embroiled in questions of subjective expecta-
tions and amorphous zones of privacy when attention is focused on
whether the policeman looking through the chain-link fence is con-
ducting a search; the policeman was acting reasonably, and reason-
ableness should be our focus.
II. SMITH V MARYLAND
The Smith case illustrates the use of a pen register for specific sur-
veillance. The facts as found by the Maryland Court of Appeals were
as follows:" The victim, Patricia McDonough, was assaulted and
robbed late one night near her home. She gave the police a description
of her assailant and told them that she had seen him changing a tire on
his green Monte Carlo automobile just before the robbery. Shortly
after the crime, she began to receive a number of threatening and
obscene phone calls from a man who identified himself as her assail-
ant. In one of these calls, the man requested that she step out onto her
porch so that he could see her. When she did, she saw driving by her
home the same green Monte Carlo she had observed the night of the
robbery. The next day, defendant Smith, in the vicinity of McDo-
nough's home, stopped and sought the assistance of a police officer
4' Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 157-59, 389 A.2d 858, 859-60 (1978).
[VCol. 15
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(the same officer to whom the victim had reported the crime) in open-
ing the locked door of his green Monte Carlo. The officer took the
license number of the vehicle, learned that it was registered to Smith,
and notified other investigating officers.
The next day, at the request of police, the telephone company
installed a pen register at its central offices to record the phone num-
bers of calls made from the telephone at Smith's residence. The pen
register showed that on that same day a call was made from Smith's
residence to McDonough's home. The police then obtained a warrant
to search Smith's automobile and residence: they found in Smith's resi-
dence a telephone book with the page containing McDonough's name
and number turned down. Subsequently, she identified Smith as the
man who had robbed her.
Smith moved to suppress the pen register evidence, which was
obtained without use of a warrant, but the motion was denied and
Smith was convicted of robbery and sentenced to ten years' imprison-
ment.
45
The Supreme Court, affirming the lower court, held broadly that
the installation and use of a pen register by the telephone company at
police request did not constitute a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment and that therefore no warrant was required. The
Court rejected Smith's claim that he had a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone.46 The Court
doubted that people entertain an actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial because "[a]U subscribers realize . . . that the
phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls
on their monthly bills. 4 Moreover, the Court assumed that people are
aware the phone company records numerical information for a variety
of legitimate business reasons.
The Court also rejected Smith's argument that, regardless of gen-
eral expectations, he had demonstrated an expectation of privacy by
using "the telephone in his house to the exclusion of all others.' 48 The
Court found the site of the call immaterial to the analysis. The site
15 283 Md. at 160, 389 A.2d at 860.
46 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
47 Id.
41 Id. at 743 (emphasis in original).
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might have been calculated to keep the contents of the conversation
private, but it could not preserve the privacy of the number dialed.49
Justice Blackmun did concede that the determination of whether
or not there was a subjective expectation of privacy may not alone be
adequate in certain contexts." Using the example of a government
announcement on national television that all homes henceforth would
be subject to warrantless entry, Blackmun stated that, although indi-
viduals would probably no longer entertain an actual expectation of
privacy regarding their houses, papers and effects, "a normative
inquiry would be proper" to determine "whether a 'legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy' existed in such cases."5'
Despite this concession, the Court also found that even if the peti-
tioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers
he dialed would remain private, that expectation was not "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable"' 52
The Court analogized the switching equipment that processes
phone numbers dialed to the human operator. Since one has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in phone calls placed through an operator,
no "different constitutional result [was] required because the telephone
company ha[d] decided to automate."53
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily con-
veyed numerical information to the telephone company and
"exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk
that the company would reveal to police the numbers
dialed."
The Court rejected Smith's argument that there was a legitimate
expectation of privacy in making local calls in view of the fact that the
telephone company does not usually record local calls. The Court
refused to allow fourth amendment protection to "exist, or not,
49 Id.
"0 Id. at 740 n.5.
"Id.
3, Id. at 743, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
"Id. at 745.
14 Id. at 744.
[Vol. 15
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depending on how the telephone company chose to define local dialing
zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its customers for local
calls! '
The Smith case was wrongly decided even when analyzed under
current fourth amendment doctrine. Telephone users do in fact
assume privacy; the majority's "assumption of risk" argument is seri-
ously misguided; and the actual expectation of privacy in numbers
dialed is one which ought to be recognized by society as a legitimate
one.
The argument advanced by the Court that telephone users know
that records will be made of toll calls and thus have no expectation of
privacy is unconvincing. 56 As Justice Marshall pointed out, the
assumption of risk analysis5 was first advanced in third-party consen-
sual surveillance cases, where "the defendant presumably had exer-
cised some discretion in deciding who should enjoy his confidential
communications.?5 1 In the case of pen registers, however, "unless a
person is prepared to forego use of what for many has become a per-
sonal or professional necessity, he cannot but accept the risk of surveil-
lance."' 5 9 Furthermore, the legitimacy of privacy expectations
"depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept
when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he
should be forced to assume in a free and open society."6
The most serious defect in the Court's assumption of risk argu-
ment is its distinction between verbal and digital transmissions. No one
would claim that people assume the risk of disclosing conversations to
telephone company circuits. The dialing of a telephone number places
the telephone company in the same position of mechanical connector
of the two lines. The Supreme Court is apparently unwilling to let
fourth amendment protection depend upon the records that subscrib-
ers know are being kept, like bills, but is willing to let it depend on
"Id. at 745.
283 Md. at 182, 389 A.2d at 872 (Cole, J., dissenting). See also Recent Deci-
sion: Installation and Use of a Pen Register Does Not Constitute a Fourth Amend-
ment "Search"--Smith v. Maryland, 38 MD. L. REv. 767, 776-78 (1979).
11 442 U.S. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 749.
19 Id. at 750. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
60 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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other intricate details of the operation of a telephone company-for
example, the mechanics of switching machines.
The Court should recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in
numbers dialed. Telephones are a modern necessity6' and, as was
noted above,62 pen registers can help reveal travel patterns, personal
and professional associations, and other such information. Knowledge
of the date, time and parties to a telephone conversation often yields
knowledge of the conversation itself: a call from a bookie to a race-
track leaves little doubt as to what was discussed.63
Legitimate expectations of privacy should be deemed to exist in
all information that individuals without criminal motives want to keep
out of the public eye. By this standard, numbers dialed deserve protec-
tion, for they convey information that most private telephone sub-
scribers would not want "to have broadcast to the world.
64
The Court could claim, without contradicting itself, that legiti-
mate and actual expectations of privacy do not extend to the occa-
sional number dialed but do extend to the development of a complete
and detailed picture of a person's life. The possible consequences of
Smith may convince the Court to impose such a limitation.65
The Court ought at least to require a showing of probable cause
that evidence of a specific criminal act will be uncovered. There is
precedent for requiring probable cause and excusing the warrant
requirement in the search incident to arrest and exigent circumstances
doctrines.6 6 Though situations in which the pen register is used will sel-
dom involve the exigency or danger to police which this compromise
envisions, the probable cause requirement would at least provide the
remedy of suppression for capricious or malicious surveillance.67
11 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
6, See text accompanying note 3 supra.
63 United States v. Dote, 371 E2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1966) (police using pen regis-
ter on bookmaker's telephone knew the "likely character" of his conversations).
64 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
65 In United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 325-26 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas cited Justice Department statistics estimat-
ing that wiretaps not supervised by a court were six to sixteen times longer in average
duration than unsupervised ones.
66 E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (search incident to
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (exigent circumstances).
6, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Nevertheless, even such a limited Smith decision fails to protect
individual privacy adequately. The next Part considers the use of the
first amendment to challenge general surveillance with pen registers.
III. PEN REGISTERS AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
While the fourth 'amendment protects privacy in general, the first
amendment is concerned with the basic freedoms of thought, expres-
sion and association.6" Associational rights under the first amendment
in particular are implicated by general surveillance. In NAACP v. Ala-
bama69 the Supreme Court observed, "Inviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association" 70
Recognizing this need for privacy, the Court has struck down
state attempts to compel disclosure of NAACP membership lists,7
organizational affiliations of school teachers" and political affiliations
of applicants to the bar. 3 Disclosure of political contributors has also
been limited. 4 The pen register, the basic function of which is to estab-
lish associations, encroaches upon freedom of association when used
for general surveillance.
A first amendment freedom of association claim has several
advantages for litigants contesting pen register surveillance. Because
the first amendment occupies a "preferred position" in the Bill of
Rights, a court must give great weight to first amendment-based
claims75 and uphold challenged governmental action only on the basis
68 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohi-
biting the free exercise therof; or abridging freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances!' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
-6 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
,0 Id. at 462.
11 Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
'2 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
13 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
11 Pollard v. Roberts, 283 E Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), aff'dper curiam, 393 U.S.
14 (1968).
11 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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of an immediate, substantial and compelling state need"6 met by the
least intrusive method possible." This last element, the least restrictive
alternative requirement, is analogous to the fourth amendment's par-
ticularity requirement. Further,
the general requirement of particularity in warrants is more
strictly applied in situations involving the seizure of materials
which arguably fall within the First Amendment's protec-
tion of free expression. This is necessary to guard against an
executing officer's seizing protected expression, if he is not
given some guidelines to direct his exercise of discretion.7"
There are difficulties, however, in obtaining the first amendment
remedy sought. First, such a claim is stronger in cases of general rather
than specific surveillance. In the case of specific surveillance, the law
enforcement interest is compellingly concrete. In cases of general sur-
veillance, the law enforcement interest is vaguer and less weighty. The
language and history of the fourth amendment79 further bolsters the
relative strength of the first amendment claim.
The second difficulty of first amendment claims against the use
of pen registers is that such associational claims have been granted
only to groups whose ends have first amendment significance, such as
political advocacy or religious worship.8" Where the group's goals do
not closely concern the first amendment, or where individuals rather
than identifiable and cohesive groups are involved, the cases offer little
hope that the claim will be accepted.8"
76 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544-46
(1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
" United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960).
"1 United States v. Manarite, 314 F Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y 1970), aff'd, 448
F2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971). See also Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Marti, 421 E2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971).
" See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
80 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 702 (1978).
S Nevertheless, there are persuasive arguments against such a limited view of the
freedom of association. See, e.g., Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Asso-
ciation, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 14 (1977) (proposing that "freedom of asso-
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A third difficulty with first amendment-based pen register claims
is the requirement of concreteness of injury. In Laird v. Tatum,12 the
Supreme Court found no justiciable controversy in the allegation that
United States Army Intelligence was conducting "surveillance of law-
ful and peaceful civilian political activity" 3 because there was no
showing by the plaintiffs of objective harm or the threat of specific
future harm. The allegation of a subjective "chill" was deemed to be
an insufficiently concrete injury to fall within the scope of the first
amendment.84
Tatum has been cited in support of findings of no justiciable con-
troversies in cases involving police surveillance of demonstrations and
public meetings, and the retention of photographs of those events in
police files; 5 collection of information concerning a government job
applicant's acquaintances and their "homosexual mannerisms;" 6 and
an FBI investigation of an antiwar demonstration. 7
No justiciable controversy was found in two other contexts. In
California Bankers Association v. Shultz,8 the American Civil Liber-
ties Union challenged a requirement, under the Bank Secrecy Act, that
banks keep certain records as chilling to first amendment rights. The
first amendment threat was seen as too remote. 9 And in Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T,90 the court, while
agreeing "in theory that subpoenas issued in bad faith may in some
ciation, long recognized as a vechicle for the exercise of... first amendment rights
... [should] now be seen as protecting associational activity that is non-speech or
non-political as well').
There is some judicial support for an expanded view of freedom of association,
see, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 486 (1965).
However, more recent decisions seem to reverse this expansion, see, e.g., Garcia v.
Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 E Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd
mem., 421 U.S. 995 (1975).
82 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
83 Id. at 2.
14 Id. at 13-14.
85 Donohoe v. Duling, 465 E2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972).
16 Finley v. Hampton, 473 E2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11 Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 E2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974).
88 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
19 Id. at 56-57.
90 593 E2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
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cases abridge First Amendment rights," refused to intervene in the
subpoena process unless the plaintiff established "a clear and immi-
nent threat of such future misconduct."9'
The Supreme Court has, however, found justiciable controversies
in cases involving a city ordinance requiring handbills to include the
names and addresses of the persons who had prepared, distributed or
sponsored them; 92 a state statute compelling the NAACP to produce
membership lists; 93 a state statute requiring that a loyalty oath of
unclear meaning be taken as a prerequisite to employment by a gov-
ernment agency;94 and statutes or actions, including data gathering,
aimed at discouraging "subversives" in pubtic academic institutions."
Also considered cognizable are actions for the expungement of arrest
records,?6 and actions based on a claim of injury to an individual's
business and reputation resulting, from a government investigation.97
The, principle to be drawn. from these cases would appear to 'be
that some personal or specific injury must be alleged to bring a claim
within the first amendment. Although data gathering and record keep-
ing can clearly be seen as injurious,9 8 the modern judicial trend is to
view that threat as not justiciable.
9' Id. at 1071 (emphasis in original).
91 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The Court said, "There can be no
doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to -restrict freedom to dis-
tribute information and thereby freedom of expression." Id. at 64.
91 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (NAACP claims such disclosure
would injure the association by reducing its membership and injure its individual
members by inhibiting their associational choice).
9, Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
9 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also Paton v. La
Prade, 469 E Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1978); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P2d 222,
120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
96 Menard v. Saxbe, 498 E2d 1017 (D.C.'Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478
E2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
" Jabara v. Kelley, 476 E Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
98 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 26 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting): "One need
not wait to sue until he loses his job or until his reputation is defamed. To withold
standing to sue until that time arrives would in practical effect immunize from judi-
cial scrutiny all surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse and their deterrent
effect."
See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 98 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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In the context of pen registers, then, cognizability of a claim
requires that some specific injury would result from compelled disclo-
sure of phone numbers dialed-such as injury to reputation, business,
educational pursuit, or political associations. This is a far heavier bur-
den than that imposed under the fourth amendment, where the inva-
sion of a legitimate privacy interest, without more, establishes a justi-
ciable issue.
The fourth problem is how to assert a first amendment claim
'when the government is using a pen register or subpoenaing telephone
records. After Reporters Committee, which denied plaintiff's claim
that the first amendment requires telephone companies to give jour-
nalists notice before turning the latters' long-distance billing records
over to the government,99 it seems clear that neither the press nor ordi-
nary citizens will receive prior notification of governmental investiga-
tion: they are precluded, at least initially, from raising objections.
Thus, the only way to get review of pen register use, before the kind of
extreme damage is done that is needed to get first amendment protec-
tion, appears to be through the telephone company.
The Court in New York Telephone appears to assume that a tele-
phone company may object before the enforcement of a pen register
order.0  The Third Circuit recently held that a telephone company was
entitled to a hearing before enforcement of a tracing order on the issue
of whether the trace would be too costly and burdensome.'"' Addi-
tional support for the position that the phone company may object on
behalf of telephone subscribers can be gleaned from NAACP v. Ala-
bama, where the Supreme Court held that the NAACP had the right
to assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal to them to be pro-
tected from compelled disclosure by the state of their affiliation with
" 593 E2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979). The case
was remanded as to the other five plaintiffs for further fact-finding. In the lower
court, the remaining reporters would have to show that there was an imminent dan-
ger that the government would subpoena their toll records in bad faith. Id. at
1070-71.
,01 United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977).
101 In re Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Register, 610 E2d 1148 (3d
Cir. 1979). The burdensomeness of a pen register on a telephone company is, how-
ever, less than that of a tracing order. In these suits, both the courts and the telephone
companies are primarily concerned with the financial burden on the companies
rather than on the rights of third parties.
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the Association as revealed by the membership lists. 02 Whether or not
a bank (which is arguably analogous to the phone company) could
assert rights on behalf of its depositors is not clear.' 3
Assuming the telephone company could assert rights on behalf of
telephone subscribers, some sort of hearing prior to enforcement of
the pen register order can be used. In Bell Telephone, the court held
that a hearing was necessary before enforcement of the tracing
order.'0 4 A commentator has noted that in the sensitive area of the first
amendment, due process mandates that judicial review either precede
or expeditiously follow final governmental action.'0 5 "[W]here First
Amendment rights are at stake, the Supreme Court has insisted on
procedural safeguards which demonstrate 'the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression." 06
In sum, the first amendment right of association provides a
promising route by which to prevent the more egregious uses of pen
registers. The advantages of such a claim are that it will engage a
court's close scrutiny and that it will be outweighed only by a compel-
ling state interest satisfied by the least intrusive means. Nevertheless,
its disadvantages and limitations are significant; such claims will usu-
ally succeed only in cases of general surveillance of groups engaging in
core first amendment activities where those groups can show a con-
crete injury. As plaintiffs' cases recede further from this paradigm,
success on the first amendment claim becomes more unlikely. Because
the vast majority of pen register cases are far from the paradigm, a
statutory strategy, pursued in the next Part, is necessary to cancel the
effects of Smith.
IV STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Present federal legislation provides inadequate protection from
general pen register surveillance. While all federal officers are forbid-
'-2 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958). See also Pollard v. Roberts, 283 E Supp. 248,
259 (E.D. Ark.), aff'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
013 See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-56 (1974).
104 In re Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Register, 610 E2d 1148,
1156-57 (3d Cir. 1979).
01 Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAiv. L. REv. 518, 532
(1970). See also Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F2d 1030,
1088 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
106 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
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den by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) °7
from using pen registers without a warrant or court order,'08 state
authorities remain uncontrolled. The statute governing electronic sur-
veillance generally, Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime
Control Act of 1968, ' does not apply to pen registers." ' This is a
large gap in the statutory scheme; states have sufficient money, tech-
nology and inclination to make frequent use of pen registers.
Moreover, federal officers are not as controlled in the use of pen
registers as a first reading of FISA suggests. FISA provides that acqui-
sition of a "search warrant or court order" by a federal officer using a
pen register is an affirmative defense to claims of violations of the
Act.'" Court order is undefined and can mean either: (a) a FISA or
Title III order, or (b) a Rule 57(b)"2 or All Writs Act' " order. The for-
mer have fourth amendment standards; the latter do not.
Further, even if FISA fully prohibited federal abuse of pen regis-
ters, FISAs location in the War and National Defense title of the
United States Code invites restrictive interpretation. Instead of being
placed in Title III, where general federal wiretapping policy is
expressed, FISA is placed within the specialized area of national secu-
rity. While the language of FISA is quite clear, a narrow interpretation
of the Act might be imposed on the grounds that the federal policy
was, given the context, obscure. The courts have established that
national security is a very different matter from law enforcement in
the fourth amendment area," and could impute to Congress a similar
distinction.
In addition to providing citizens with greater privacy rights
against federal law enforcement than against state law enforcement,
'07 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III 1979).
,01 Id. at § 1804(a).
109 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
1° United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1977).
50 U.S.C. § 1809(b) (Supp. III 1979).
112 FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b). This rule provides for interstitial orders in aid of law
enforcement.
"3 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). One commentator has developed an elaborate
argument, founded upon the assertion that Congress assumed that the fourth amend-
ment applied to pen registers, that "court order" means an FISA or Title III order.
Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of
Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 557, 589-92 (1980).
'" E.g., United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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the statutory scheme permits evasive cooperation between state and
federal officials. While FISA includes a criminal penalty for the use of
pen register information not obtained under statute,' I the provision
requires that such use be "knowing or [with] reason to know.!" 6
Although a finding of taint in the evidence will still result in suppres-
sion of that evidence,' 7 the greater protection provided by the crimi-
nal penalty can be nullified by a free flow of information from state to
federal law enforcement officers with "no questions asked" about its
source. Further, the suppression remedy would be more satisfactory if
the principal targets of pen register abuse were subject to prosecution;
that, however, is not the case. The most frightening use of pen register
surveillance is to spy on and harass citizens, rather than to prosecute
them.
Finally, the user of a pen register can achieve full wiretap capabil-
ity simply by plugging headphones or a tape recorder into one of the
jacks on the register."II The ease of such wiretapping and the difficulty
of detection encourages this practice.
To eliminate this confusion and to fill in the gap in protection
against pen register use by state authorities, Congress should amend
Title III to include pen registers. Such increased protection would not
unduly hamper law enforcement efforts. Although Title III limits the
crimes for which electronic eavesdropping can be used and requires a
relatively high level of decision to use this technique," 9 there has been
no suggestion that these requirements have been especially difficult to
meet.' 20 Depending on the state, it is possible that a county or local
I' 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a) (2) (Supp. III 1979).
116 Id.
Id. at § 1806(e).
In re Joyce, 506 E2d 373, 377 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975).
119 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976). The limitation is to serious crimes. Robbery, the
crime in Smith v. Maryland, would be included, id. at § 2516(2).
'10 Although this is not an easily quantifiable statistic, a suggestion of how little
law enforcement has been hampered by Title III can be gleaned from the authoriza-
tion rate of interception requests by state and federal officials since Title III was
enacted. From 1968 to 1976, the average annual authorization rate was 99.77o. In
absolute numbers, about two requests are denied per year. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, XVIII REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS Table 7 (1977).
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district attorney can make the application. This is not a burdensome
requirement. ' 2' Furthermore, the complex application which is at the
heart of the Title III protections is dispensable in emergency situa-
tions' 22 with respect to conspiratorial activities involving national secu-
rity interests or activities characteristic of organized crime. Consider-
ing the very great dangers of abuse without regulation this minimal
cost to law enforcement seems tolerable.
it is not unreasonable to believe that Congress wi be amenable
to incorporation of pen registers in Title III. In fact, the legislative his-
tory indicates that, if today's judicial doctrines and technological capa-
bility were before Congress when Title III was passed in 1968, pen reg-
isters would have been incorporated into the body of that Act.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that widespread pen registers use
is inconsistent with congressional intent is in the insistence that Title III
is to be "pattern[ed] ... after what the Supreme Court said in the
Berger and Katz decisions"' 2 The Katz decision to which Congress
was trying to conform in 1968 was a high point in fourth amendment
protection. One ought not read into Title III the conservative under-
standing of "legitimate expectation" that has emerged from the Burger
Court.'2
Berger v. New York is even more important in this context. The
principal complaint in Berger was that the New York wiretapping stat-
ute "lacked [the] particularization" required by the fourth amend-
ment. 25 Particularization of a wiretapping order was of great concern
to the drafters of Title III, however badly that concern was translated
into the statutory language.' 26 One manifestation of the desire to parti-
2I If authorized to do so by state statute, he would be "the principal prosecuting
attorney of any political subdivision" of the state, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976). See
also United States v. Tortorello, 342 E Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 480 E2d
764 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); State v. Frink, 296 Minn. 57, 206
N.W.2d 664 (1973).
,22 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a) (1976).
,23 114 CoNG. REc. 14,484 (1968) (remarks of Sen. McClellan), S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968).
124 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
125 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
12618 U.S.C. § 2519(1)(1976). "Each of these requirements reflects the constitu-
tional command of particularization ... "' S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
74-75, 101 (1968).
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cularize in Title III was the requirement that wiretapping "be con-
ducted in such a way as to minimize" interception of communications
not authorized to be intercepted. 27 Congress clearly wanted to autho-
rize only specific searches through electronic eavesdropping. Though
this intent to particularize has been eviscerated by the Supreme Court
in Scott v. United States, 28 the general congressional aversion to gen-
eral surveillance in Title III is apparent.
Since the enactment of Title III, new developments in pen register
technology and the law have made the argument for inclusion even
more forceful. A modern pen register does far more than simply
record numbers dialed: it also records the date and time of dialing and
the ringing of incoming calls. 29 These features increase the temptation
for frequent use because no great amount of manpower need be
expended. Transfer of the data to key punch cards is easy and data
bank use is thereby encouraged. Frequent, widespread use, and con-
nection to a data bank, are the hallmarks of general surveillance today.
Moreover, the possibility of abuse by surreptitious use of a tape
recorder or headphones to obtain full wiretap capability has been
enhanced in newer models, in which a voice-activated switch can auto-
matically turn on an attached tape recorder.'30 This new technology,
which Title III did not contemplate, makes amending Title III to cover
pen registers the logical way to update the Act to protect privacy of
communications to the same extent intended in 1968.
The law governing pen registers has changed considerably since
1968, most notably in their removal from fourth amendment protec-
tion by Smith v. Maryland. The issue of the applicability of the fourth
127 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
1 436 U.S. 128 (1977) (agents' willful noncompliance with minimization
requirement did not necessitate supression of evidence so obtained). The problem
might be attributed to the Act itself, which fails to define minimization. For critiques
of the Supreme Court's analysis of Title III minimization requirements, see Fishman,
The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 315 (1979); 28 CATH.
U. L. REV. 143 (1978); 53 TUL. L. REv. 264 (1978).
'"See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
,O Note, Circumventing Title IL The Use of Pen Register Surveillance in Law
Enforcement, 1977 DUKE L.J. 751, 759 n.45, citing Brief for Appellant at 10, United
States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 E2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976).
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amendment to pen registers did not squarely arise until 1973, but in
several cases decided between 1973 and 1977 the courts consistently
held that the fourth amendment did apply to pen registers."' This
threshold protection against the use of pen registers must have been
assumed in 1968.
Amendment of Title III to include pen registers is consistent with
renewed congressional interest in citizen privacy. In the Privacy Act, 3 2
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,113 the proposed Citizens
Privacy Protection Act,' 34 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978,' 3  Congress has demonstrated a desire to protect privacy
even in areas, such as wiretapping and bank records, where individual
privacy might hamper law enforcement efforts. The Right to Financial
Privacy Act is a particularly clear rejection of the Supreme Court's
insensitivity to privacy needs. It overrules the Miller case by requiring
that the government "reasonably describe" the bank records it wants,
in addition to going through one of a number of formal procedures,
each of which requires notice to the customer and often an opportu-
nity to object. 36
CONCLUSION
Smith v. Maryland is the latest in a line of cases excludng sophis-
ticated surveillance devices from constitutional search requirements.
Although there are persuasive arguments that current fourth amend-
ment analysis is fundamentally misguided, a complete overhaul of
search and seizure doctrine is unlikely. Attorneys can attempt to limit
Smith to the situation of specific surveillance which occurred in that
case. Associational claims under the first amendment are other ways
,3' See note 5 supra and cases cited therein. See also Note, The Legal Restraints
upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
1028, 1044 n.94 (1975).
,32 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
'33 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. III 1979).
"I S. 855 and H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
,35 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1976).
136 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3404-3408 (Supp. III 1979).
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to lessen the impact of Smith, but those claims will be of doubtful
value in the vast majority of pen register cases. The most effective
solution seems to be a statutory one: congressional overruling of
Smith by explicit incorporation of pen registers in Title III, or similar
legislation by receptive states.
-John Applegate
Amy Grossman
